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Abstract—I study the effect of indirect ties between the firm’s 
scientific advisory board members and the Food and Drug 
Administration advisory committees on underwriter prestige, 
underwriting fee, underpricing and the initial offering price 
range for firms pursuing highly uncertain opportunities. 
Prestigious underwriters compete to underwrite securities 
offered by firms connected to the regulator. This result in 
overpricing even though the underwriter seeks to enforce 
underpricing. The findings contribute to the Coase-Knight 
debate about the role of uncertainty for firm boundaries. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Capitalizing on the entrepreneurial opportunities that one 
discovers is an essential element of the wealth creation 
process [1].  However, one of the major problems for any 
entrepreneurial venture is obtaining the resources to develop 
the opportunities it discovers and sustain its long term 
viability [2]. The underwriter helps the entrepreneurial firm 
to secure access to the investors. But it needs a reputation for 
pricing security issues fairly. The underwriter can price risks 
reasonably well because there is a known distribution of 
probabilities for risk events. But knightian uncertainty cannot 
be priced because there is no known distribution of 
probabilities for uncertain events. Because it is difficult to 
price uncertainty, bankers will seek out issuers that present 
less uncertainty for its institutional investors.  Paradoxically, 
for firms engaged in technological discoveries where the 
future payoffs are uncertain, it is exactly this uncertainty that 
is the source of entrepreneurial profits. If the payoff is highly 
certain, competitors will all invest in the “right” technologies 
and compete the excess profit to zero [3]. Under this 
backdrop, how does the knightian uncertain firm convince 
the underwriter about the relative certainty of its valuation? 
 
This paper investigates how the underwriter’s perceived 
uncertainty about the entrepreneurial firm, shaped by the 
number of indirect firm-regulator ties the issuer has, affect 
its assessment about the relative uncertainty of the firm’s 
valuation and the pricing of the Initial Public Offering. I 
study life science companies with scientific advisory boards 
(SABs) because the presence of scientific advisors suggests 
that these firms are still working on basic research and is 
characterized by a need for guidance amidst uncertainty [3, 
4]. My sample is a subset of these science-based companies 
- issuers with SABs that launch IPOs from 1996 to 2006. 
The firm-regulator ties are institution-based ties between 
members of a firm’s SAB and the Food & Drug 
Administration (FDA) scientific advisory committees. 
 
I examine the effect of these ties for science-based 
companies in the IPO context because I want to address a 
basic question in the Coase-Knight debate about the role of 
uncertainty for firm boundaries. Coase [5] objected to 
Knight’s argument that firms are formed to bear the costs of 
uncertainty, arguing that specialized services for judgment 
under uncertainty are contractible in the market [6]. But 
there are strong theoretical reasons for why entrepreneurial 
judgment is non-contractible. Besides information 
asymmetry problems related to moral hazard and the Arrow 
information paradox, there is also the problem of ensuring 
that both parties to the transaction share the same judgment 
[6-10]. When the innovation belongs to an emergent 
category that is populated with only a few instances, there is 
insufficient knowledge to generate a distribution of 
probabilities to arrive at common judgment [3, 11]. Yet, we 
routinely observe firms seeking to capitalize on 
opportunities with highly uncertain future cash flows launch 
IPOs to raise equity capital. 
 
I hypothesized that among high uncertainty firms, the firm 
with a significant number of ties to the regulator may be 
mislabeled as a low uncertainty firm by the underwriter. The 
erroneous categorization increases the contractibility of 
entrepreneurial judgment and facilitates resource flow from 
the investors to the entrepreneurial firm.  
 
Underpricing is used to measure the investors’ willingness 
to commit resources to the entrepreneurial firm. All things 
being equal, the IPO proceeds are maximized if 
underpricing is minimized [12, 13]. The less underpriced a 
stock is, the greater the investor’s willingness to commit 
resources to the firm. By contrast, the ex-ante market value 
of each share is unknown so it is impossible to know 
whether a firm had maximized its IPO proceeds based on 
the amount of the capital raised. 
 
The research design takes advantage of the institutional 
features embedded in the US IPO setting that produces 
underpricing to propose that the underwriter will overprice 
securities of firms with indirect ties to the regulator. Bankers 
engage in practices that set the IPO price lower than the 
market price; they also manage investors’ demand for the 
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security [14-20]. These activities set a floor for the 
security’s price in the IPO aftermarket.  
 
Despite the underwriter’s control of the IPO environment 
and its tendency to underprice securities, I document a 
negative relationship between indirect firm-regulator ties 
and underpricing. Ceteris paribus, IPOs with more than 
twenty indirect firm-regulator ties are predicted to be priced 
progressively higher than the first-day closing prices.  
 
The statistical estimates were derived from a three-stage 
least squares that include underpricing, underwriter prestige, 
underwriting fee, initial offering price range and the number 
of firm-regulator ties as correlated dependent variables. The 
ties are positively related to underwriter prestige and 
negatively related to underpricing, underwriting fee and 
initial offering price range. The results are robust to 
alternative econometric specifications.  
 
The findings suggest the underwriter assumes that indirect 
access to the regulator can reduce valuation uncertainty for 
the focal firm Because the firm-regulator ties are perceived 
as uncertainty reducing, prestigious underwriters compete to 
underwrite IPOs of firms indirectly connected to the 
regulator and end up overpricing the IPO in spite of the use 
of practices to enforce underpricing.  
 
II. UNDERWRITING AND VALUATION UNCERTAINTY 
Endorsements from a reputable underwriter reduce the 
investors’ concerns with regard to the uncertainty of the 
entrepreneurial venture’s value [4, 21]. Because the 
underwriter is an active player in the capital markets, it runs 
the risk of eroding its reputation capital when it makes 
pricing mistakes. The underwriter is obligated to both sides 
of the market – consistently overpricing the securities may 
erode the goodwill with the institutional investors and 
consistently underpricing the securities may deter 
prospective issuers [17]. Pricing mistakes can affect the 
underwriter’s ability to bring new companies public in the 
future. Thus, the underwriter is motivated to preserve its 
reputation capital, which in turn provides assurance to 
investors about the valuations of the companies the 
underwriter endorses. In the IPO book building process, the 
lead underwriter in the syndicate first attempts to ascertain 
the future cash flow of the firm under various scenarios and 
then arrive at a filing range bounded by two potential offer 
prices – a high offer price and a low offer price. The 
underwriter gives the filing range to the institutional 
investors and asks them to provide feedback on the number 
of shares they are willing to buy and the price that they are 
willing to pay within the filing range [18, 22, 23]. 
 
III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
To examine whether a firm discloses its indirect firm-
regulator ties to the underwriter in order to allay concerns 
about valuation uncertainty and consequently attract 
endorsements from reputable underwriters, we examine four 
correlated dependent variables in the primary capital markets 
– underwriter prestige, underwriting fee, initial filing price 
range, and underpricing. 
 
A. Underwriter Prestige and Underwriting Fee 
Because the underwriter augments its reputation capital 
by underwriting high quality issues and rent out its 
reputation capital to new issuers going public, reputable 
underwriters should both charge higher fees and underwrite 
less risky issues [21, 24, 25]. But it is questionable whether 
financial intermediaries can process information about 
intangible assets for science-based and technology firms 
[26, 27]. I argue that when the future cash flows arising 
from the issuer’ intellectual capital is fundamentally 
unknowable, the underwriter use firm-regulator ties as a 
reverse proxy for uncertainty. The private disclosure of the 
ties by the issuer help the underwriter economize on 
information processing costs – costs that could be infinitely 
high because the future cash flows of science-based and 
technology firms are knightian uncertain. 
 
Since underwriters augment their reputation capital by 
underwriting high quality issues (i.e. accurate valuation), I 
expect the underwriters to compete for issuers with multiple 
indirect firm-regulator ties. Having multiple ties to the 
regulator is important if the underwriters believe that 
indirect influence is fraught with difficulties. The 
gatekeeper, by virtue of his or her independence, can refuse 
to cooperate[28]. But a firm can gain access to the regulator 
via alternative networks by building multiple indirect ties 
[29]. This means that bankers may expect firms with more 
ties to have better access to the regulator. Therefore, I argue 
that firms with multiple indirect firm-regulator ties will 
attract the endorsements of more reputable underwriters and 
yet pay a lower underwriting fee. I state the hypotheses as 
follows: 
 
H1: The number of firm-regulator ties is positively related 
to the underwriter’s prestige score 
 
H2: The number of firm-regulator ties is negatively related 
to the underwriting fee. 
 
B. Underpricing and Range 
To further establish the proposition that underwriter 
view the indirect firm-regulator ties as uncertainty-reducing, 
I examine the relationship between the ties and 
underpricing. There are several institutional features 
embedded in the IPO setting that enforce underpricing. This 
creates a natural experimental context for the study. 
Specifically, even if underpricing and uncertainty is 
positively correlated [17, 30], firms with relatively certain 
valuations should still be underpriced. The underwriter has 
recurring relationships with institutional investors but only 
temporary relationships with each IPO firm [13]. Therefore, 
the underwriter supply investors with underpriced stock to 
encourage demand for IPO deals in the future and cultivate 
loyalty among institutional investors [31, 32]. When the 
underwriter discovers stronger demand for the shares than 
the quantity available, the underwriter only adjusts the 
supply of shares and the offer price partially [15, 16]. The 
book-building process intentionally creates excess demand 
for issuers’ shares and reduces the likelihood for under-
subscription [23]. Furthermore, by underpricing the IPO, the 
underwriter reduces the need to stabilize prices in the 
aftermarket [14].  
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Figure 1.  Underpricing and Uncertainty 
 
The preceding analyses suggest a logic that is delineated in 
Fig. 1 below. P1, P2 and P3 refer to the IPO prices in three 
different scenarios. Pt+1 is the first-day closing price. The 
broken vertical line holds uncertainty constant for the focal 
IPO. Line 1 provides the relationship between underpricing 
and uncertainty if underpricing is strictly a premium for 
uncertainty. In this case, there would be no underpricing if 
there is no uncertainty. Line 2 provides the relationship 
between underpricing and uncertainty when the underwriter 
has additional incentives for underpricing IPOs. The broken 
arrow reflects the upward shift from line 1 to line 2, 
indicating that the underwriter will underprice the IPO even 
if there is no uncertainty. Line 3 provides the relationship 
between underpricing and uncertainty when the underwriter 
misperceived that firm-regulator ties are uncertainty-
reducing and the underwriter actually overpriced the IPO. 
The broken arrow reflects the downward shift from line 2 to 
line 3, indicating that the focal IPO price is actually higher 
than the first-day closing price even though there is 
uncertainty about the issuer’s valuation.   
 
A final piece of corroborating evidence would be the 
presence of a negative relationship between the initial 
offering price range and the number of firm-regulator ties. 
The reason is that lower valuation uncertainty also implies 
that there is a narrower range of valuation outcomes 
[16].Overall, I state the hypotheses as follows: 
 
H3: The number of firm-regulator ties is negatively related 
to underpricing 
 
H4: The number of firm-regulator ties is negatively related 
to the initial offer price range 
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Prior research suggests that it is not appropriate to sample 
firms of high and low uncertainties together [4]. Because the 
presence of advisors suggests a need for guidance amidst 
uncertainty [3], I sample 93 life science firms with scientific 
advisory boards. The IPOs are firm commitment offerings 
with the overallotment option. They are issued from 1996 to 
2006 as common stock on the NASDAQ stock exchange. 
Prospectuses were downloaded from the SEC Edgar and 
data coded accordingly. Additional data came from a variety 
of sources including the FDA website, Pubmed, the Center 
for Measuring University Performance, United States 
Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO), and the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) database. 
 
A. Variables 
Rank is the underwriter prestige score based on the 
Carter-Manaster ranking methodology, which uses the 
investment banks’ positions in the tombstone 
announcements to calculate their prestige scores. Fee is the 
gross payment made to the underwriter divided by the IPO 
proceeds. UP is the difference between the first-day closing 
price and the offer price with the difference divided by the 
offer price. Range is the difference between the upper bound 
and the lower bound of the initial price range provided by 
the underwriter to the institutional investors normalize by 
the midpoint of the range. Freg is the number of firm-
regulator ties. 
 
To calculate Freg, I code network information from the 
institutional affiliations of the SAB scientists and the FDA 
advisory committee members. The network data is used to 
construct an affiliation matrix. As shown in equation (1), I 
multiply it with its transpose to generate indirect networks. 
 
            
a d g a b c
TEvent A A b e h d e f
c f j g h i
  
  
= =  
    
  (1) 
 
I then focus on the ties that each firm has to the FDA and 
use the count of the ties to construct a measure of the firm-
regulator relationship. Each firm-level observation about the 
number of ties is statistically independent because this is a 
measure of firm-regulator ties rather than inter-firm ties. 
 
Alliance is the total number of alliances a firm has with 
other organizations (both business and research 
organizations) at the time of the IPO. Drug is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is in a core 
biotechnology field like therapeutics (i.e. drugs) and 0 
otherwise. Loc is is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of 1 if the firm is located in San Diego, San Francisco or 
Boston. VC is a dummy variable that take on the value of 1 
if a firm is backed by venture capitalists and 0 if otherwise. 
Firmage is the difference between the founding date and the 
IPO date and is rescaled in years. Lnasset is the natural log 
of assets, which were originally measured in millions of 
dollars. Lnemp is the natural log of the number of 
employees. I control for Periodic effects with the Nasdaq 
Biotechnology Index, year dummies, and a stock bubble 
dummy.  
 
Update refers to the percentage change from the midpoint of 
the initial offering price range to the final offer price (OP).  
        /2 2
P P P PL h L hUpdate OP
   + +   = !
                     (2) 
 
This is shown in equation (2) above where PL and PH are the 
lower and upper bounds of the initial offering price range 
respectively. 
 
USUP refer to underwriter-specific underpricing, which is 
calculated as the moving average of the actual initial returns 
of IPOs underwritten by the focal underwriter minus 
market-wide averages for the same period [33]. This 
measure controls for underwriter selection. Because of the 
institutional features embedded in the IPO setting, the firm’s 
ability to reduce underpricing is largely a function of 
underwriter selection. If the CEO is dissatisfied with the 
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IPO price after book-building, his options are limited to 
reducing the shares sold or withdrawing the IPO. Selecting a 
low underpricing underwriter should be an outcome of 
strong monitoring effort. The persistence of underwriter-
specific underpricing is a visible reflection of the 
underwriter’s market power. That is, the CEO can reduce 
underpricing by selecting a low underpricing underwriter. 
USUP substitutes for corporate governance variables that 
proxy for the strength of monitoring mechanisms. 
Experienced inside board members bonded with substantial 
equity holdings may prevent excessive underpricing by 
selecting a low underpricing underwriter. But there are 
reverse causality problems in using board characteristics and 
executive compensation to proxy for the strength of 
monitoring mechanisms [13, 34, 35]. For example, vesting 
directors with more equity ownership may enhance 
monitoring But a firm may had awarded more salary and 
less equity because the firm presents comparatively more 
risk for the directors. Likewise, responsible inside directors 
may engage in monitoring activities. But the presence of 
more outside directors may be due to the ineffectiveness of 
inside directors in monitoring in a prior period. Therefore, 
we cannot easily infer monitoring from governance 
variables.  
 
Sabsize is the count of the number of SAB members. 
Rdspend is standard deviation of the SAB member 
institutions research expenditure. Sdpub is the standard 
deviation of the SAB members’ average annual publications. 
Npat is the number of patents that the firm has on the IPO 
date. Scitmt is the number of senior executives with 
scientific doctorates. Pipe is the number of products that the 
firm is developing.   
 
B. Econometric specifications 
The major dependent variables are correlated; there are 
non-recursive relationships in the equations and the 
endogeneity of the firm-regulator networks need to be 
accounted for. Running a seemingly unrelated regression 
[SUR] allow the disturbances to be correlated and improves 
the estimates. But I also need to use the residuals from the 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) to obtain an estimate of the 
error variance-covariance matrix in the third stage, applying 
the generalized least square (GLS) technique. This yields a 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) equation, which combines 
the 2SLS and the SUR. Specifically, I specify a system of 
structural equations connecting M jointly dependent and A 
exogenous variables: 
; ( , ) ;
yi





= + + = + = =  
       (3) 
where Di is a column vector of T observations on the jointly 
dependent variable to be predicted in the ith equation and i = 
(1, 2, … , M). Further, Yi is the T ! mi matrix of values on 
mi (<M) jointly dependent variables of the ith equation and 
yi is the corresponding coefficient vector. And Xi is the T ! 
ki matrix of values on ki (<A) exogenous variables of the ith 
equation and i is the corresponding coefficient vector. 
Finally, i is a column vector of T structural disturbances 
with E(i) = 0 and E(i’j) = ijIT, bounded by (i , j =1.....M).  
 
Similar to the SUR, the 3SLS also rely on correlated 
residuals to maximize efficiency of the estimates - the 
greater the correlation of the disturbances, the greater the 
efficiency gain. In the limit, GLS brings no efficiency gain 
over the OLS in two situations. First, when the explanatory 
variables in one equation are a subset of another equation, 
there is no efficiency gained in the smaller equation. 
Second, when the explanatory variables in different 
equations are nonsingular, linear combinations of the same 
set of variables, OLS and GLS are identical. Because such 
equations yield only equation-specific disturbances, there is 
no efficiency gained over OLS. 
 
Therefore, I adopt a modeling strategy that ensures the 
equations are specified differently. In cases where I desire to 
control for the same phenomenon (for example, quality of 
the firm’s science), I use different proxy variables in the 
equations. Ideally, the different proxy variables should also 
have reasonably low correlations with each other so that 
sufficient common variances are captured in the covariance 
matrix of disturbances. Paradoxically, this also means that 
equation-specific disturbances are likely to be orthogonal to 
Freg because it is common to four equations. Finally, I use 
the t-distribution instead of the z-distribution to compute the 
test statistics because of the small sample size. 
V. RESULTS 
Table 1 report means and standard deviations between the 
independent variables. Due to space constraints, the 
distribution for the dependent variables and the correlation 
matrix are not reported. However, these results are available 
upon request. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (N = 93 firms) 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
USUP 6.74 4.23 -11.6 16.55
Alliances 2.89 2.69 0 19
VC 0.87 0.34 0 1
Sabsize 8.34 3.72 1 27
Sdpub 2.59 1.42 0.23 9.69
Rdspend 68338 33617 14279 212398
Scitmt 2.85 1.78 0 8
Patents 12.08 19.22 0 104
Pipe 7.06 4.42 1 27
Firmage 6.14 4.12 1.3 23.8
Lnasset 3.2 1.01 0.31 5.7
Lnemp 4.32 0.8 1.61 6.4
Loc 0.35 0.48 0 1
Drug 0.76 0.43 0 1
Update -0.14 0.27 -0.58 0.71  
Table 2 report the initial statistical results from the system 
of equations. USUP is positively associated with Fee and 
UP. VC is negatively related to Rank and UP with statistical 
significance. Drug negatively predicts Rank. Patents 
positively predict Fee. In additional analyses, I include a 
variable on the product stage that the firm is in but the 
results are statistically insignificant. Lnasset positively 
predicts UP and Rank. Loc positively predicts Rank. 
Overall, results on the control variables add to the mixed 
evidence on science-based IPOs [4, 36, 37].  
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Table 2 (N = 93): The effects of firm-regulator ties on valuation uncertainty 
Rank Fee UP Range Freg
Intercept 6.669*** 0.174 10.98 0.152*** -4.829






Alliances 0.0102 1.734 8.06x10
-4



















effects Included Included Included Included Included
R-Square 0.111 0.187 0.501 0.045 0.481
F-Stat 3.31 5.07 7.38 2.64 11.28
Unstandardized regression coefficients reported 
Two-tail tests, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
However, the results relating to Freg unanimously support 
the hypotheses. Freg is positively related to Rank and 
negatively related to Fee, Range and UP.  
 
A. Robust analyses 
To account for the possibility that there is a latent 
variable composed of the TMT’s academic connections to 
research organizations that is highly correlated with firm-
regulator ties and may affect underwriter prestige, I use 
instrumental analyses to split the ties into predicted TMT ties 
attributed to the number of PhD holders in TMT and the 
residual firm-regulator ties. In additional analyses, I ran the 
set of regressions with the predicted TMT ties replacing the 
number of PhD holders in the TMT and the residual firm-
regulator ties replacing the number of firm-regulator ties. 
The results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
 
In additional analyses, I also account for the presence of 
Nobel laureates, the number of prominent scientists that the 
firm has and outlier values. In all these cases, the results for 
the hypotheses remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
Overall, the linkages among the hypotheses ensure that the 
hypotheses are highly falsifiable. If the argument about 
uncertainty is false, not only would one or more of the 
hypotheses be unsupported. More importantly, we would 
not observe the opposite directions for the hypothesized 
relationships – a positive relationship between the ties and 
underwriter’s reputation but a negative relationship between 
the ties and the price-related dependent variable (i.e. 
underwriting fee, price range and underpricing). In 
particular, we should not expect to see the underwriters fail 




Figure 2.  Predicted values based on Freg 
 
However, as shown in fig 2, the trend for the predicted 
values show that the expected closing price falls 
progressively below the expected offer price when there are 
more twenty indirect ties. This results in overpricing. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Theoretically, firms seeking to capitalize innovations that 
are knightian uncertain should not be able to contract out 
entrepreneurial judgment. The only possible exception is 
when there is a matching continuum of entrepreneurs and 
investors such that every entrepreneur can find multiple 
investors who share his entrepreneurial judgment but instead 
of starting the venture, invest limited funds in the 
entrepreneur’s start-up [10]. With regard to technological 
uncertainty, such situations are very limited even when 
applied to specialized angel investors and venture 
capitalists. Yet, we observe science-based companies selling 
securities in primary capital markets where both the 
underwriter and the investors are uncertain about the 
issuer’s future technological prospects. Therefore, I question 
how the underwriter determine the issuer’s valuation when 
its future cash flows are knightian uncertain. 
 
This paper show that the contractibility of entrepreneurial 
judgment increases when the underwriter misclassify the 
high uncertainty firm that has a significant number of firm-
regulator ties as a low certainty firm. The theoretical 
implication is that it is possible to contract entrepreneurial 
judgment even when the firm does not fall into a category 
with a known distribution of probabilities. This solves the 
intertwined problem of acquiring external capital and 
sustaining unique profits. 
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